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Expectation of reward can be shaped by the observation of actions and expressions of other people in one’s environment. A person’s
apparent confidence in the likely reward of an action, for instance, makes qualities of their evidence, not observed directly, socially
accessible. This strategy is computationally distinguished from associative learning methods that rely on direct observation, by its use of
inference from indirect evidence. In twenty-three healthy human subjects, we isolated effects of first-hand experience, other people’s
choices, and the mediating effect of their confidence, on decision-making and neural correlates of value within ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC). Value derived from first-hand experience and other people’s choices (regardless of confidence) were indiscriminately
represented across vmPFC. However, value computed from agent choices weighted by their associated confidence was represented with
specificity for ventromedial area 10. This pattern corresponds to shifts of connectivity and overlapping cognitive processes along a
posterior-anterior vmPFC axis. Task behavior and self-reported self-reliance for decision-making in other social contexts correlated. The
tendency to conform in other social contexts corresponded to increased activation in cortical regions previously shown to respond to
social conflict in proportion to subsequent conformity (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010). The tendency to self-monitor predicted a
selectively enhanced response to accordance with others in the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ). The findings anatomically decom-
pose vmPFC value representations according to computational requirements and provide biological insight into the social transmission
of preference and reassurance gained from the confidence of others.
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Introduction
The human brain can use a variety of learning strategies to better
its situation. Unifying economic theories suggest that different
decision processes converge to a single expectation of satisfaction
(or “value”) that will be gained or lost from available actions—
correlates of which are found in activity throughout ventrome-
dial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) (Levy and Glimcher, 2012; Bartra
et al., 2013) and guide decisions toward options of greater value.
Whether this activity represents a single computation of value, a
collection of distinct computations, or both is not clear. How-
ever, there are both computational and anatomical reasons to
suspect subregional specialization.
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Significance Statement
Decades of research have provided evidence that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) signals the satisfaction we expect
from imminent actions. However, we have a surprisingly modest understanding of the organization of value across this substantial
and varied region. This study finds that using cues of the reliability of other peoples’ knowledge to enhance expectation of personal
success generates value correlates that are anatomically distinct from those concurrently computed from direct, personal expe-
rience. This suggests that representation of decision values in vmPFC is suborganized according to the underlying computation,
consistent with what we know about the anatomical heterogeneity of the region. These results also provide insight into the
observational learning process by which someone else’s confidence can sway and reassure our choices.
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Reward predictions from different types of information are com-
puted differently. For instance, one can learn about an action’s value
by maintaining a running average of rewards received from per-
forming it. However, some knowledge is only socially and/or infer-
entially accessible; if one observes someone else perform an action,
then one can recruit inferential strategies for a judgment of that
action’s value. For instance, people provide signals of high confi-
dence when they have good knowledge of the likely outcomes to
their actions (Patel et al., 2012), so confident actions of others should
have greater influence on our own appraisals (Thomas and
Mcfadyen, 1995). Therefore, if the other person appears to know
what she is doing (and assuming her intentions are similar to mine),
one can use a rule of imitate-if-appears-confident or, more flexibly,
one can infer what she knows from her actions and confidence and
then combine this with knowledge inferred from other cues and
personal experience. These and similar strategies, unlike directly
sampling outcomes, may require steps of indirection and integration
of multiple cues (e.g., of others’ preference and confidence), but also
enable us to compute value in the absence of first-hand experience
with prior choice outcomes. We developed a task that provides dif-
ferent types of information for evaluating the value of the same
choice: first-hand knowledge, choices of others, and their confi-
dence. We then compared contributions of each information source
to decision making and neural representations of value across
vmPFC.
We considered that different computations of value could make
use of shifting connectivity, cytoarchitecture, and overlapping cog-
nition toward the anterior of vmPFC (Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004).
Cytoarchitecturally, laminar density, and granular layer IV volume
increase along a posterior to anterior axis (Ongu¨r et al., 2003;
Mackey and Petrides, 2010) indicative of increasing interarea con-
nectivity (Barbas, 2007). Local connectivity required for integrating
value signals in situ dominates posterior vmPFC. In contrast, ante-
rior regions maintain a balance of local and distant connectivity that
can additionally recruit higher-order input (Sepulcre et al., 2010).
Correspondingly, moving anterior and dorsal from classical repre-
sentations of value in area 25 (through areas labeled as area 14 m
(Mackey, 2010) or 10 m and 10 r; Ongu¨r et al., 2003) to medial area
10, known overlapping processes become more abstract, integrative,
and inferential (Ramnani and Owen, 2004; Amodio and Frith, 2006;
Burgess et al., 2007; Sescousse et al., 2013). Representations of value
that require more inferential or integrative processes may map to
distinct regions across this cortical landscape.
An anatomical distinction between value from first-hand
knowledge and value from agents’ confidence-weighted influ-
ence would exemplify the mapping of value to cortex as deter-
mined by its computational requirements. It would also provide
the foundation for investigation of the neural mechanism by
which the supporting confidence of others guides our actions.
Based on changes of connectivity and overlapping function, value
from confidence-weighted influence was predicted to recruit
anterior regions of vmPFC preferentially while direct, personal
sampling and the main effect of agents’ choices (regardless of
confidence) was not.
We linked individual differences of influence on task perfor-
mance to sensitivity of neural responses to corresponding task
stimuli. Finally, to establish the relevance of our task and findings
to social environments, we tested the relationship between ob-
served effects (neural and behavioral) and influence of others on




Participants were right-handed and had no history of brain injury or
mental disorder. Each gave informed consent. Inclusion criteria for fMRI
analysis included at least some use of each information source during the
behavioral task to enable contrasts between value-based activation de-
rived from different sources (exclusions were indicated by near-perfect
prediction of choice outcomes by only one or two influences, a simple
rule-based strategy that precluded quantitative examination of behavior
by leading to extremely large and unstable estimates of regression coef-
ficients) (five participants were excluded). Head movements were re-
quired to be consistently smaller than a single voxel (2 mm) (1
participant excluded). Twenty-three participants (13 male, age: M 26 SD
3.6) met all requirements. Each received 110 Danish Krioner (kr) (20
USD) for time spent participating and 60 kr (10 USD) for winnings on
tasks (all subjects were paid this same amount). The study was approved
by Central Denmark Region ethics (No. 29718).
Task
The urn task (Fig. 1) examines how participants make decisions when
provided with different sources of information. It asks participants to
infer the color of the next marble to be drawn (red or green) for each of a
series of 160 mixed urns, with opportunities to do so by inferring other
people’s information about the likely outcome. Participants had the fol-
lowing information about each urn: a random sample of eight marbles,
four predictions described as being made by past participants (four
“agents”) based on their own samples from the same urns, and the con-
fidence expressed by those agents. All samples were said to be replaced
before the final marble was drawn.
Agents’ faces were presented with neutral expressions. To ensure that
any effects were due to the use of agents’ confidence, rather than its
inference, we communicated confidence with an explicit cue described to
subjects during training: the smug (confident cue) or perplexed (uncon-
fident) animated smiley that appeared within the indicated choice (red or
green marble) (Fig. 1). Agents’ choices were also said to be presented in
the time taken by the agent to make them. Confident response times were
between 325 and 1000 ms. Unconfident response times were between
1800 and 2600 ms. Once all agents’ responses were made, participants
had 1300 ms to observe them before their own sample appeared. All
information was available for 1250 ms before a choice could be made,
cued by presentation of choice options.
The participant never saw agent samples and agents were said never to
see the participant’s sample. Agent choices were seen before personal
samples because they were assumed to take longer to process. There was
no time limit for participant decisions once the cue for a choice was
presented. After a choice, confirmation of the choice was shown briefly
and followed by a 1 s intertrial interval. The task took 23 min to complete,
on average.
After instructions for the task, using visual displays, participants were
quizzed by the experimenter on the meaning of each display item and
asked what might be in the urn given various combinations of informa-
tion. Instructions were repeated if necessary. It was critical before pro-
gression that participants understood that samples reflected “randomly
mixed” urn contents (the urn shook on arrival for emphasis) and were
replaced. No trial outcome was provided, so participants could not learn
to associate outcomes with colors or agents. They were required to make
the best use of the information available and told that a random urn
would be selected and sampled to see if the subject was correct, with a
potential reward of 30 Danish Kroner (DKK).
The experimenters actually programmed agents’ choices, agents’ con-
fidences, and agents’ deliberation times in a way that fully counterbal-
anced the factors of participants’ samples, agents’ choices, and the
confidences of agents favoring either color. Agents were drawn with
replacement from a set of 30 images from the Radboud face dataset in
sepia tone (Langner et al., 2010). The use of fictional agents’ responses
was necessary to achieve sufficient statistical power and ensure that each
subject experienced each possible combination of agents’ choice, agents’
confidence, and personal sample. This was explained to participants dur-
ing debriefing.
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The task was designed to study how participants decide across a range
of combinations of sample, agents’ choice, and agents’ confidence. Ac-
cordingly, trials were generated by creating every possible combination,
across trials, of: the number of agents favoring red (vs green), confidence
for agents favoring red, confidence of agents favoring green, and partic-
ipants’ samples—all varying independently of one another. Therefore,
there was no real-world optimal strategy (in the sense that the observa-
tions were not actually produced by simulating draws from an urn whose
contents could then be predicted) and each participant was paid the
maximum reward at the end of the study.
Confidence expressed by any agent was the same as confidence ex-
pressed by any other agent that predicted the same color. At the risk of
this aspect appearing odd to participants, it enabled us to test our predic-
tions with a clear choice  confidence factorial design that identified
independent contributions of each information source to decisions and
neural activity. It also kept the task length manageable for an fMRI study.
During debriefing, no participant expressed doubt in the authenticity of
the agents’ responses.
There were 160 trials in the scanned task. For each number of agents
choosing red (0 – 4), there were 32 trials. Sets of 32 were made up of 7
sample distributions (1–7 reds in the participant sample; samples with 4
reds were presented twice as often as the other combinations) evenly
distributed over each available combination of agents’ confidence. When
1–3 agents chose red, there were 4 confident/unconfident combinations.
When 0 or 4 agents chose red, there were 2 options (high and low confi-
dence in the agents’ chosen color).
Procedure
Before scanning, outside of the scanner, the participants guessed the next
marble from a series of 28 urns and indicated confidence in these predic-
tions based only on a sample of eight marbles from each (no agents’
choices). Participants were told that their own predictions during this
task would be used for the urn task of future participants. This provided
participants with the agents’ perspective. Participants were also given a
30 DKK “prize” for this task. Next, after receiving instructions, the par-
ticipant practiced for 20 trials before beginning the task in the scanner.
Finally, after scanning, the participant filled in questionnaires measuring
self-monitoring and the tendency to conform outside of the laboratory
before being debriefed.
Behavior analysis
We performed a factorial, mixed-effects logistic regression, which we
refer to as the “component value behavioral model,” to analyze partici-
pant choices (dependent variable: per trial choice of red vs green) as a
function of a number of candidate explanatory factors and their interac-
tions. Choices were analyzed in R (version 3.2.3, R development Core
Team RRID:SCR_001905) using the lme4 package (version 1.1.12). The
model allows for the measurement of influence of multiple sources of
information on the probability of choosing red. This includes added
value of a confident agent’s choice over an unconfident one. The follow-
ing predictors of participant choice of red (described below) were added
to the regression: S: proportion of marbles in participant’s sample that
were red; O: proportion of agents choosing red; CR: confidence of agents
choosing red (0.5 low, 0.5 high); CG: confidence of agents choosing
green (0.5 low, 0.5 high); ORCR: proportion of agents choosing red 
their confidence; and OGCG: proportion of agents choosing green  their
confidence
Each predictor was scaled to a range for 0 –1 and centered around its
mean for each subject. Common scaling allows for the estimated coeffi-
cients to be comparable across predictors, with each expressed in units of
Figure 1. Urn task. On each trial, a new urn of randomly mixed marbles is presented. Contents are hidden. Animation of five hands individually reaching for five different samples from the urn
occurs (the first two parts last 1.5 to 2 s). Predictions of the next marble drawn from the urn and their associated confidence in those predictions of four agents are shown. Agents were represented
as sepia-toned faces with neutral expression. Agents’ predictions were expressed by the color of the circle positioned next to their faces. Confidence indicated as the expression within that circle and
the speed at which the answer was shown (rapid  smug  high confidence). Agents’ answers took between 300 and 2500 ms to appear. Once agents’ choices were in, they remained on the screen
for 1250 s. Next, the participant’s own sample of marbles appeared from the bottom of the screen was displayed with all other information for a further 1250 ms. The sample contained eight marbles,
with one to seven of them being red. This was the event modeled in the fMRI analysis. Finally, the participant was asked to make a prediction (red or green). No choice feedback was provided.
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change in log odds of choice corresponding to a change from the minimal
to the maximal value. Centering is recommended (Cohen, 2003) because
it allows main effects to be interpreted as effects when all other effect
variables are at their mean without affecting interaction terms. Interac-
tion terms were calculated from the product of the scaled and centered
predictors. CR and CG had no meaning when no agents chose that color
and so these variables were set to their mean (i.e., 0) in these instances,
giving them no statistical effect.
The rationale and interpretation of these variables is as follows. S and
O are two independent sources of information about the urn in the
design; our major question is whether the confidence CR and CG modu-
lates the effect of O. S codes the relative proportion of red (vs green)
marbles in the agent’s own sample and a positive regression coefficient
for it captures an increasing tendency to choose red when more red
marbles are observed. Because the fraction of green marbles is equal to
1  S, a model with predictors for both effects (and an intercept) would
be rank deficient; however, after mean centering, S codes the difference in
red versus green marbles sampled (with a positive value indicating a
preponderance of red and negative values the opposite), capturing both
effects symmetrically. The same point holds for O. The effect of O cap-
tures an increasing tendency to choose red when the relative proportion
of agents choosing red (minus those choosing green) is larger. After mean
centering, O  OG (proportion choosing green). Therefore, the inter-
actions ORCR and OGCG capture the difference of this effect for red and
green choices (respectively) between confident and unconfident agents.
The main effects of confidence, CR and CG, capture the baseline effect of
confident votes when the votes are evenly split and control for any overall
change in choice tendency when red or green votes are confident inde-
pendently of the number of votes.
Each effect contained both a fixed and a random effect term; that is, a
mean slope at the group level, an error term allowing that slope to vary
from subject to subject, and a full covariance matrix among the random
slopes. We verified that all of these effects should be included in several
ways. First, the significant tests for all regression coefficients (save the
intercept) in Table 1 reject the null hypotheses corresponding to the
nested models with any one effect being zero. We also present Akaike
information criterion (AIC) comparisons for the full model against a set
of submodels, each omitting one effect. Conversely, we also tested for
progressive improvement in model fit to behavior (by AIC and a likeli-
hood ratio test,  2 p  0.05; Vazquez et al., 2010) as effects were added
incrementally (in the order: intercept, S, O, CR, and CG, ORCR, and
OGCG. Each significantly improved the model fit to behavior (detailed
results not reported). An additional interaction term between S and O
did not improve the fit.
Component value behavioral model
The equation for the component value behavioral model is as follows:
logitP ij  0  1Sij  2Oij  3CR ij  4CG ij
 5ORCR ij  6OGCG ij  
where P is the probability choosing red for the i th trial for subject j, 
represents regression coefficients including random effects for all coeffi-
cients and  is error.
Individual difference measures
Task behavior
To measure individual differences of information influence, we mea-
sured the effect of each information source on the likelihood of each
participant’s decisions. Using the fixed and random effects of the “com-
ponent value behavioral model,” we calculated the fit (via negative log
likelihood) of this model to choices of individual participants. We then
calculated the fit of four other models (using the same fitted parameters
as the full model): one without S, one without O, one without both CR or
CG, and one without both ORCR and OGCG. The effect of each model
reduction on behavior likelihood (smaller model  full model) repre-
sented the impact of the subtracted variable(s) for that participant: S
effect, O effect, C effect, and OC effect, respectively (Hampton et al.,
2008). The intent of this procedure was to measure the effect of each
variable in each subject, but using units of differential log likelihood,
analogous to variance explained, rather than estimated regression coef-
ficients. This is because the scaling of the latter can be erratic from subject
to subject. These effects were entered as covariates in a separate group-
level fMRI analysis and tested for relation to behavior outside of the
laboratory.
Choices in other contexts
This study was agnostic to whether findings are unique to social environ-
ments, but it was imperative to test the relevance of the results to social
behavior outside of the laboratory given their social context. To test the
relevance of task behavior, we used a self-report “conformity scale”
(Mehrabian and Stefl, 1995). The conformity scale assesses weight placed
on other people’s choices relative to one’s own information in a variety of
social contexts. It requires participants to rate agreement or disagree-
ment (on a scale from 4 to 4) with 11 statements referring to reliance on
others for decisions. Higher scores mean greater reliance on others. The
scale does not assess the use of the others’ confidence, so to test its
relationship to task behavior, we created a simplified model that con-
tained only S and O (removing confidence from the model). Then, sim-
ilar to above, we calculated the effects of S and O on model fit. We then
tested the correlation between these effects (and difference between
them) and conformity scale scores. Self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974) was
also assessed measuring the tendency to adapt behavior in response to
cues from an audience, but no effect was hypothesized given that there
was no audience in this task.
Neuroimaging
fMRI procedure
Participants were instructed and given time to practice until the task was
understood and responses could be made in 4 s. The task was presented
with Presentation version 12 software (Neurobehavioral Systems RRID:
SCR_002521). Scanning took place at the Danish Neuroscience Centre,
Aarhus, Denmark on a 3 tesla Siemens Trio Scanner fitted with a 32-
channel head coil. The urn task displays were back-projected and ob-
served via a mirror and responses were collected from the right hand
using a fiber-optic button box.
Image acquisition
Functional EPI data were collected as T2-weighted EPIs in an interleaved
slice acquisition order. Each EPI volume contained 52 slices with the
following parameters: voxel size 2  2  2 mm, TE 27 ms, TR 2800 ms,
flip angle: 90°. The small 2 mm voxel size reduced orbitofrontal cortex
dropout and distortion efficiently. Then, 176-slice 1 mm voxel whole-
brain anatomical scans were also acquired for coregistration with the EPI
data using an MPRAGE sequence on a 256  256  176 grid with the
following parameters: TE: 3.7 ms, inversion time: 900 ms, TR: 2420 ms,
flip angle: 9°.
First-level fMRI analysis
All image analysis was performed with tools of FMRIB’s Software Library
(FSL RRID:SCR_002823) version 5.0.6 (Smith et al., 2004). Preparation
Table 1. Fixed effects from mixed effects logistic regression of each variable’s
effect on choice of red
Variable  SE p Partial R 2 	AIC
(Intercept) 0.03 0.07 0.62
Proportion of sample that is red (S) 10.26 0.87 0.001 0.38 1160
Proportion of agents choosing red (O) 9.96 0.75 0.001 0.55 2297
Confidence of agents choosing red (CR ) 2.57 0.30 0.001 0.15 321
Confidence of agents choosing green (CG ) 2.61 0.30 0.001 0.15 332
Proportion of agents choosing red 
confidence (ORCR )
1.78 0.53 0.001 0.01 8.2
Proportion of agents choosing green 
confidence (OGCG )
1.40 0.53 0.01 0.01 0.4
R 2 of full model is 0.68 (McFadden’s pseudo R 2). Partial R 2 is calculated as 1  (log likelihood of full model/log
likelihood of model without designated predictor). Corresponding change in AIC value is also provided.
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of the EPI data used FSL defaults (FEAT 6.0). Volumes acquired during
significant (
1 mm) head movements were replaced with neighboring
volumes and events with modeled responses occurring during these ac-
quisitions were removed from all models. Independent component anal-
ysis was used to visually identify and remove remaining artifacts in the
data using MELODIC (Beckmann and Smith, 2004). General linear
models were fit in prewhitened data space for each individual participant.
Regressors and temporal derivatives were convolved with the default FSL
hemodynamic response function (gamma function, delay: 6 s, SD: 3 s),
and filtered by the same high-pass filter as the data. Single-participant
results were transformed using nonlinear deformation algorithms into
standard space (Montreal Neurological Institute, MNI152).
Component value fMRI model
In the “component value behavioral model” of choices, the dependent
variable was choice of red (vs green) and variables were constructed as
they related to the evidence in favor of choosing either color. In the fMRI
analysis, the dependent measures were neural activity during these
choices. However, rather than covarying with the tendency to choose
options on the basis of a dimension such as color, BOLD activity is widely
reported to vary along the dimension of the chosen versus unchosen
option, with larger responses in medial PFC when the chosen (or about to
be chosen) option is more likely to be correct, carries more reward, or is
otherwise more strongly preferred (Tanaka et al., 2004; Daw et al., 2006;
Kim et al., 2006; O’Doherty et al., 2007; Behrens et al., 2008; Wunderlich
et al., 2010). Therefore, to test for analogous neural effects as on the
behavior, we modeled the BOLD data using precisely the same set of
explanatory variables as the behavioral analysis, but expressed with re-
spect to evidence supporting the chosen versus unchosen options on each
trial rather than the red versus green options. So when red is chosen, SA
and OA (for evidence in “accordance” with the choice) are defined in
terms of red samples and choices. When green is chosen, they are defined
in terms of green samples and choices. In keeping with the literature on
neural correlates of decision variables, we refer to activity correlated with
these variables as reflecting their influence as components of “chosen
value,” meaning that the overall supporting evidence that the subject’s
choice was correct. However, we stress that, given the symmetry of our
task (where choices are mutually exclusive and evidence supporting red
opposes green), such activity can be understood as reflecting relative
(chosen minus unchosen) value, as indeed has been reported for medial
PFC (Boorman et al., 2013).
The set of variables in the fMRI analysis track those from the be-
havioral analysis, but coded in terms of accordance of an information
source with the subject’s choice. Each variable had a parametric
weight of accordance that varied trial by trial. As in the behavioral
model, variables were scaled to a range of 0:1 and mean centered
(orthogonal to a constant term). Like the behavioral model, interac-
tion regressors were calculated by multiplying respective main effect
regressors after scaling and mean centering.
The component value fMRI model contained the following variables:
SA: proportion of marbles in sample in accord with participant’s choice;
OA: proportion of agents’ choices in accord with participant’s choice; CA:
confidence of accordant agents (0.5 or 0.5); CD: confidence of discor-
dant agents (0.5 or 0.5); OACA: accordant agents’ choices  their con-
fidence; and ODCD: discordant agents’ choices  their confidence plus
intercept.
“A” and “D” subscripts represent accordance or discordance, respec-
tively, of the information source with the choice. Just as in the behavioral
analysis, after mean centering, SA codes the relative proportion of accor-
dant (minus discordant) marbles and OA codes the relative proportion of
accordant (minus discordant) other agents’ choices; therefore, SD (
SA) and OD ( OA) are redundant. Also as with behavior, CA and CD
are mutually independent and their interactions with OA (and OD 
OA) capture the difference of effect on BOLD from other agents’ ac-
cordant (vs discordant) choices when those agents are confident com-
pared with when they are unconfident. Also as with behavior, CA and CD
had no meaning (and were not presented) when no agents chose the
color, so these variables were set to the mean (i.e., 0) in these instances,
having no statistical effect.
Integrated value fMRI model
Preceding the full model fit described above, which aimed to decompose
the influence of different sources of information on value-related BOLD
correlates, we wished to verify the presence of activity related to overall
value. To define this, we extracted the likelihood assigned by the compo-
nent value behavioral model to each chosen option of each subject and
took this choice probability as our estimate of the integrated chosen
value. Such probabilities reflect the transform of the weighted sum of
evidences, through the logistic softmax so as to range from 0 to 1, which
provides a well normalized summary of the overall evidence in favor of a
red versus green choice, or chosen minus unchosen value, which has been
shown to track medial PFC activity (Daw and Doya, 2006).
Accordingly, the fitted model to each subject was as follows:
Yi  0  1Si  2Oi  3CR i  4CG i  5ORCR i  6OGCG i  
for each i th trial, where  represents fitted mixed- and random-effect




. If the participant chooses green, then the choice
likelihood is 1 
eYij
1  eYij
. This vector of likelihoods was entered, along
with a constant, to predict the neural correlates of integrated value (see
Fig. 3A).
Timing
The modeled fMRI event, for all regressors, was a 1250 ms period when
agents’ choices and personal samples were concurrently available before
a choice could be made. During this period, both vmPFC sample-driven
activation and agent-driven activation were at peak levels (see Fig. 4). A
temporal derivative of each event was added to the model to control for
slight errors of fit to the hemodynamic response. The interval between
modeled events varied as determined by participant reaction time (M
1.2 s, SD 1.6 s) and variable time taken for choices of agents to appear
(range 0.32–2.7 s). Eighty percent of participant reaction times were
under 1.7 s and 90% under 3 s. This resulted in a positively skewed
distribution of periods between modeled events (M 8.6 s, SD 1.7 s).
Spatial linear parametric analysis
To characterize anatomical patterns of activation associated with esti-
mated value from SA (first-hand experience of sample), OA (agents’
choices alone), and OACA (interaction effect of agents’ confidence and
agents’ choices), we generated five anatomically defined spheres of 10
mm diameter linearly traversing an anatomical axis (Nicolle et al., 2012;
Sul et al., 2015). This axis spanned the superior medial gyrus, dorsal to
the gyrus rectus. It began in area 10 m/14 m (Ongu¨r et al., 2003; Mackey
and Petrides, 2010), at MNI coordinates [0 mm, 32 mm, 16 mm],
within a region defined by meta-analysis as associated with choice value
(Levy and Glimcher, 2012; Bartra et al., 2013). It ended to the frontal pole
at the approximate center of ventromedial area 10 (MNI coordinates 0
mm, 64 mm, 8 mm), a region associated with abstract reasoning about
mental states (Amodio and Frith, 2006; see Fig. 4). Mean percentage
signal change was extracted from each sphere for each variable. Percent-
age signal change in response to S, O, and OC variables, as well as the
contrasts of OC  S and OC  O (to test how the difference of responses
to different information change along this axis) were examined by
mixed-effect linear regressions (lme4 with Kenward–Roger approxima-
tion of dof).
Fixed impulse response sets were then fitted to each regressor in the
component value fMRI model. These sets spanned a period of 19.6 s
divided into 7 time bins, each the length of a TR (2.8 s). This period began
at the point that agents’ responses began to appear on the screen. Mean
parameter estimates for each of SA, OA and OACA were extracted in each
sphere and plotted in Figure 4. To investigate the nature of the interac-
tion between of agents’ choice and confidence, we did the same for a
second GLM that included separate regressors for confident and uncon-
fident agents supporting the participant’s choice. Remaining regressors
of the component value fMRI model were included as covariates (SA, CD,
and ODCD). We plotted the time courses of the effects of confident agents
and unconfident agents in Figure 5.
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Group-level fMRI analysis
Both group models were fitted to parameter estimates from each lower-
level analysis, using mixed effects in FSL. All group-level Z (Gaussianised
T/F) statistical images represent whole-brain searches using cluster cor-
rected statistics (FMRIB’s Local Analysis of Mixed Effects (FLAME) 1 
2; Woolrich et al., 2004; Z 
 3.0 voxel threshold, p  0.05 cluster signif-
icance threshold) shown to be robust against false positives (Eklund et al.,
2016) using automatic outlier deweighting (Woolrich, 2008).
Individual differences (group level)
Individuals vary on their reliance on others for decision making and this
is a reasonably stable trait (McGuire, 1967). We harnessed these differ-
ences to test relationships between behavioral influence of specific types
of information, their effects on neural correlates of value, and social
influence on choice in other contexts.
Neural effects  behavior. The four measured influences on individual
participant behavior (S effect, O effect, C effect, and OC effect) were
added, mean-centered, as between-participant covariates in a new
group-level component value fMRI model analysis. We asked whether
the behavioral O effect, S effect, their difference, and the OC effect pre-
dicted the sensitivity of the brain to these influences, highlighted by fMRI
effects of OA, SA, and OACA. This analysis used small volume correction
within our a priori anatomical region of interest, the vmPFC. This mask
was created as the conjunction of all Harvard–Oxford Atlas regions fall-
ing within vmPFC with a range along the x-axis of 18 mm to 18 mm
and maximum height level of 18 mm to cover, with some room for error,
regions anatomically specified as vmPFC in prior studies (Mackey and
Petrides, 2010).
Conformity and self-monitoring. To test the relationship of neural ac-
tivity during the task to real-world behavior, we tested whether sensitivity
to different sources of information during task execution (SA and OA)
related to self-reported self-reliance for decision making (conformity
scale) and self-monitoring behavior by adding these as covariates in a
separate group-level analysis of the component value fMRI model. Age
and gender were also added as covariates.
vmPFC effects were insensitive to individual differences, so we ex-
plored outside of this region. For the conformity comparison, we used
small volume correction within regions identified to respond more to
social conflict in proportion to individual differences of subsequent con-
formity in an independent study (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010).
Social conflict being a driver of conformity in the brain (Wu et al., 2016),
it was predicted that those rating high on self-reported conformity would
experience greater neural responses to conflict with agents.
Although self-monitoring would not affect behavior in our task (with
no live audience), individuals high in self-monitoring behavior might
react differently to social cues. With no a priori region of interest for this
contrast, we used a whole-brain cluster-corrected analysis.
Results
While scanned with fMRI, participants repeatedly predicted the
color of marbles to be drawn from an urn by balancing several
sources of evidence: their own sample of marbles from the urn,
predictions described as made by four other agents based on their
private samples from the same urn, and those agents’ confi-
dences. We sought to measure subjects’ reliance on the subject’s
sample versus agents’ choices, particularly to examine the extent
to which the influence of the agents’ choices was modulated by
their confidence. The latter is a key measure in this setting for
distinguishing behavior from simpler heuristics such as imita-
tion. This is because an agent’s confidence implies the quality of
the agent’s knowledge informing the choice and therefore the
extent to which their opinion should be trusted. Indeed, a differ-
ential effect of confident agents can be captured in a Bayesian
ideal-observer model (simulations not shown), which infers the
proportion of marbles in the urn from the different sources of
evidence by inferring and marginalizing over the agents’ private
samples, with confidence as a signal of more decisive evidence.
Behavior
We used a multilevel mixed logistic regression to estimate param-
eters reflecting how the tendency to predict red was influenced by
each information source that should affect it monotonically.
Each variable was established as a distinct contribution to
choice behavior (Fig. 2, Table 1). At the group level, participants
were more likely to predict red after samples with more red (vs
green) marbles (S), more agents choosing red (vs green) (O),
higher confidence of agents associated with red (CR) (regardless
of how many agents chose that color), and lower confidence for
green (CG). The magnitude of the coefficients for S and O indi-
cates that the four agents (at average confidence) were relied on
approximately the same amount as the sample of eight marbles,
meaning that each of the agents’ choices had an impact approxi-
Figure 2. Behavioral effects. Probability (mean proportion) of choices for red as a function of: reds in sample (A), frequency and confidence of red choices by agents (B), and frequency and
confidence of green choices by agents (C). Error bars indicate SE.
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mately twice that of observing a single marble in terms of infor-
mation on this task. Table 1 additionally presents the different
variable effects in terms of AIC and variance explained according
to McFadden’s pseudo R 2.
Our key question concerned the interaction that measures
whether agents’ choices have a differential effect when they are
confident. Here, as hypothesized, we found that the effect of each
agent’s choice on participant decisions was greater when that
agent was confident (ORCR, OGCG).
Conformity and self-monitoring scales
We next considered whether individual differences in this rela-
tively stylized laboratory task tracked an index of real-world so-
cial behavior. Greater reliance on personal samples during the
urn task corresponded to greater self-reliance for decision mak-
ing in other social contexts (r  0.461, p  0.013, mean con-
formity scale score 3.7 SD 11.4; see Fig. 7A). Controlling for
gender and age, the effect remained significant (r  0.37, p 
0.049). There was no relationship between the conformity scale
and the effect of agents on behavior (p 
 0.4), most likely
due to the complication of agent confidence. In contrast, self-
monitoring relates specifically to behavioral adjustments to social
cues to enhance reputation and would not be expected to show an
effect in the absence of a live audience and this was confirmed by
the data.
Neuroimaging
We pursued a parallel strategy in the brain to distinguish influ-
ence of each information type on neural correlates of estimated
value in vmPFC. Because vmPFC activity is well known to track
the degree to which the chosen option is correct or likely to be
rewarded (“chosen value,” often relative to the unchosen option;
Tanaka et al., 2004; Daw et al., 2006; Kim et al., 2006; O’Doherty
et al., 2007; Behrens et al., 2008; Wunderlich et al., 2010), we
redefined all of our explanatory variables in terms of information
indicating the chosen (vs unchosen) option will be correct, rather
than red versus green. Therefore, neural results are described
with respect to “accordance” (evidence indicating that the sub-
ject’s chosen option will be correct) versus “discordance” (evi-
dence indicating that the subject’s choice will be incorrect). Note
that these are symmetric: evidence that the subjects’ choice is
correct is equivalently evidence that the other is incorrect.
Neuroimaging findings are reported as group-level cluster-
corrected statistics with a cluster-forming voxel threshold of Z 
 3
and cluster significance level of p  0.05. Results are described in
format: [peak location in MNI coordinates (mm)], Z score of peak
voxel, p-value of cluster, size of cluster in voxels (and minimum
cluster size at p  0.05). Scaling of variables should be considered
when interpreting the results (i.e., a change from 0 to 4 agents’
choices is scaled the same as a change from 0 to 8 marbles in a
sample). All observed effects relate to when all other variables are at
their mean. Mean effect contrasts all endured whole-brain cluster
correction. Only activations within the mPFC are reported because
this was the focus of our study. Between-subject analysis used small
volume correction using independent masks of regions of interest
(detailed in the Materials and Methods).
Integrated value fMRI model
Neural correlates of overall chosen value from all information
sources were found in central vmPFC ([8 50 8], Zmax  4.08,
p  0.001, 410 voxels (min 76)). Negative correlations (higher
activity when evidence favors the unchosen option more) corre-
lated with dmPFC activity ([0 26 48], Zmax  4.82, p  0.001,
1345 voxels, min 76; Fig. 3A).
Component value fMRI model
We then tested whether these correlates of integrated value could
decomposed according to the contribution of the different infor-
mation sources (Fig. 3B). For this, we examined the effects of the
same explanatory variables as the behavioral model, but ex-
pressed in terms of accordance versus discordance with the sub-
ject’s choice. Sample accordance (SA) predicted central vmPFC
activity ([2 38 8], Zmax  4.12, p  001, 446 voxels, min 76).
Sample discordance (a negative effect of SA) increased dmPFC
activity ([4 30 44], Zmax  4.1, p  0.001, 276 voxels, min 76).
Accordance of agents’ choices (OA) similarly increased central
vmPFC activity (peaks: [2 22 12] and [10 44 12], Zmax 
4.19, p  0.001, 679 voxels, min 77), whereas discordance of
Figure 3. Neural representation of value in vmPFC. Activations color-coded with respect to
amount of evidence supporting the likelihood of the participant’s choice being correct (clusters
defined by Z 
 3.0, cluster significance p  0.05). A, Neural representation of value from the
integrated value fMRI model combining all available information. B, Distribution and overlap of
activity correlating with increasing and decreasing value computed from information sources of
the component value fMRI model. SA  personal sample, OA  agent choices, OACA  inter-
action of agent choices and their confidence.
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agents’ choices (the negative effect of OA) increased dmPFC ac-
tivation ([2 20 46], Zmax  6.03, p  0.01, 797 voxels, min 77).
The conditional main effect of agent confidence (of accordant or
discordant choices) did not produce activation in MFPC at this
threshold.
As with behavior, the key question concerned activity corre-
sponding to the differential impact of agents’ choices when they
are confident versus unconfident, captured by the interaction
(OACA). Such an interaction was observed for BOLD activity only
in anterior mPFC (amPFC), primarily occupying ventromedial
area 10, with a small extension through anterior 14 m (Mackey
and Petrides, 2010; peaks [8 58 6] and [4 62 2]], Zmax  3.78, 85
voxels, min 79). This was the only activation for this contrast in
the brain. Within this region, unconfident agent choices did little
to influence the representation of value, whereas confident
choices had a clear effect (see Fig. 5).
Spatial linear parametric effect
Next, to examine formally the impression of spatial separation
between the effects of the different information sources, we com-
pared statistically spatial profiles of key effects of component
value fMRI model analysis (SA, OA, OACA) along an anatomically
defined axis from vmPFC to amPFC (Fig. 4A). Only OACA in-
creased its effect (in percentage signal change) along this axis
(  0.03, SE  0.01, p  0.04). SA and OA (p 
 0.27), and the
difference of response between these variables also varied along
the axis: OACA  SA (  0.03, SE  0.01, p  0.045) and OACA
 OA (  0.03, SE  0.02, p  0.026). This rejected the null
hypothesis that value-based activity relying on different informa-
tion sources has a common spatial profile.
Peristimulus plots along this axis reveal that, moving anteri-
orly, regions of vmPFC respond with increasing selectivity for
value derived from confident agents. Neither effects of agents’
accordant choices (independent of confidence) nor of accordant
samples shared this anatomical specificity (Figs. 4, 5).
Individual differences
Neural effects  behavior
We next tested whether component neural correlates predict
component influence on decision-making behavior using a
between-subject analysis. At the group level, the effects of differ-
ent information sources on choices, as estimated from behavior
Figure 4. Effect time courses across vmPFC. A, Anatomically defined spherical regions of interest spanning the superior medial gyrus from area 14 m (Mackey and Petrides, 2010) to
ventromedial area 10. B, Plots of mean effects of interest within the component value fMRI model across 5 time bins are 2.8 s (1 TR) beginning at the onset of agents’ responses. Figure
shows relative nonspecificity of SA and OA across the region, the increasing specificity of OACA toward dorsoanterior regions, and the sustained response to agents’ choices OA into the
response window of SA. Error bars indicate SE.
Figure 5. Effects of confident and unconfident agents across vmPFC. Mean effect of an adapted component value fMRI model that separates effects of confident agents’ choices from unconfident
agents’ choices across the five spheres and time bins of Figure 4 are shown. Figure shows the increasing specificity of socially learned value that is contingent on agents’ confidence toward
dorsoanterior regions of vmPFC. Error bars indicate SE.
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for each individual, were added as covariates to the component
value fMRI model. Contrasts were made between them. Within a
mask of vmPFC and at a conservative cluster forming threshold
(Z 
 3), we found that weight placed on personal samples (S
effect) predicted a greater neural response to personal sample
accordance with choice (SA) ([6 54 4], Zmax  3.83, p  0.03,
32 voxels, min 28). Dorsal and anterior to this, relatively more
weight placed on the choices of agents (O effect  S effect) pre-
dicted a greater neural response to agents (OA) ([4 60 10],
Zmax  4.02, p  0.05, 28 voxels, min 28; Fig. 6).
Conformity and self-monitoring scales
Finally, we sought to test whether neural effects during the exper-
iment reflect real-world behavior. Conformity scale scores pre-
dicted greater dmPFC activation when going with one’s own
sample [0 26 38], Zmax  5.02, p  0.006, 50 voxels, min 25) and
activation just anterior to right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ)
(supramarginal gyrus) in response to conflict with others’ choices
[66 28 26], Zmax  4.38, p  0.01, 40 voxels, min 25; Fig. 7B).
Self-monitoring, which reflects the tendency to alter behavior in
response to social cues from an audience, predicted a greater
response to increasing accordance with agents in activity extend-
ing into rTPJ (peak [62 28 36], Zmax  4.45 with subpeak, Z 
4.08, [56 36 28], p  0.003, 120 voxels, min 74). This indicated
differential treatment of social agreement with greater self-
monitoring even without a live audience (Fig. 7C).
Discussion
This study identified distinct behavioral and neural effects of
distinct types of evidence used for making predictions. Behavior-
ally, each information type influenced decisions in a sensible di-
rection. Confident agents had a greater influence on choices of
participants, the hypothesized signature of complex, and integra-
tive use of information to evaluate options.
Collectively, increased reward expectancy from all evidence was
tracked indiscriminately across a posterior to anterior axis in
vmPFC, confirming earlier findings (Kim et
al., 2006; Daw et al., 2006; Behrens et al.,
2008; Wunderlich et al., 2010). However,
this signal could also be decomposed ac-
cording to the contribution of distinct com-
ponents. Increased reward expectancy due
to accordant samples and accordant agents’
choices (regardless of confidence) increased
activity across vmPFC. In contrast, value
that varied with accordant agents’ choices
but conditional on their confidence was
represented preferentially in ventromedial
regions of area 10. This is a distinct neurobi-
ological marker of assurance from another
person’s confidence.
Segregation of value representations
over regions of systematically varying cyto-
architecture is consistent with heterogeneity
of their computation. The anatomical loca-
tions of confidence-based value processes
are likely the resolution of computational
requirements and connectivity of support-
ing anatomy. The cytoarchitecture and con-
nectivity of amPFC suggests that value
estimates from confident agents specifically
involve a form of higher-order cognition
(Ongu¨r et al., 2003; Mackey and Petrides,
2010; Sepulcre et al., 2010). Although influ-
ences of agents in the task can be modeled (as in our regression)
simply as the counting of agents’ choices weighted by their confi-
dence, the weighting itself is a signature of the variable’s metacogni-
tive treatment.
The nature of this treatment and how it relates to anterior
vmPFC is not yet known. One possibility is the use of inference.
The urn task can be solved by using statistical inference to infer
the contents of the urn given the observed evidence. This requires
marginalizing agents’ private samples, the quality of which is
inferred from an interaction of agents’ choice and confidence. In
principle, Bayes’ rule can be invoked to infer (and then margin-
alize out) the probable state of the agents’ samples. This could
involve inferences of agents’ knowledge from their behavior
which would account for BA 10 involvement (Frith and Frith,
2012). Such computations are likely part of a broader class of
inferential influences on choice (Tolman, 1948; Hampton et al.,
2006, 2008; Daw et al., 2011; Solway and Botvinick, 2012). In
addition, BA 10 involvement could relate the confluence of cog-
nitive processes (Ramnani and Owen, 2004; Zaki, 2013) such as
the integration of observed and nonobservable information
(Burgess et al., 2007).
Both inferential and integrative processes are useful because
they flexibly allow a naive observer to make decisions in new
environments. In social contexts, they allow for adaptable valua-
tion using shifting combinations of inferred knowledge, inten-
tions, impulsivity, and optimism of others before deciding how to
use their choices to inform one’s own. From this perspective, our
findings support a theory that the evolution of area 10 could
relate to cognitive specialization that optimizes decision making
in human cultures with the complexity of human expression
(Povinelli and Preuss, 1995; Dunbar and Shultz, 2007).
It less likely that differences between neural correlates of value
relate to a difference of mathematic heuristics: these regions do
not come up in fMRI contrasts of counting methods, addition, or
multiplication (Piazza et al., 2002; Kawashima et al., 2004). Sim-
Figure 6. Individual differences of task behavior. Effects of information sources on choices, for each individual, were added as
covariates to the component value fMRI model analysis. vmPFC responses to SA are predicted by the influence of samples on choice
behavior. amPFC responses to OA are predicted by the relative influence of agents (O effect  S effect) on choice behavior.
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ilarly, whereas previous studies have examined associative learn-
ing in social contexts (Behrens et al., 2008; Hampton et al., 2008;
Burke et al., 2010), associative learning was precluded in the pres-
ent study by the omission of trial outcomes and infrequent rep-
etition of agents.
Previously, however, neuroscience has highlighted the rela-
tionship between mPFC and associative learning about the reli-
ability of others. For example, Behrens et al. (2008) showed that
mPFC is recruited to update beliefs about the accuracy of advice.
Meshi et al. (2012) and Boorman et al. (2013) found that mPFC is
related to using and evaluating expertise. It will be interesting to
explore how inferential and associative learning about the reli-
ability of others relate.
Nicolle et al. (2012) found that the ventral– dorsal vmPFC axis
delineates action-relevant from action-irrelevant preferences.
Subsequent work has shown that individual differences of value
representation along a (ventral– dorsal) vmPFC axis also distin-
guishes self- and other-regarding individuals (Sul et al., 2015). In
the present study, we found that ventral area 10 does represent
action-relevant preferences, but depends on the computations
required. It may be the abstract nature of the calculation (coun-
terfactual choice in the previous study, abstractly inferred or in-
tegrated information in the present) that determines amPFC
involvement. Indeed, specificity across the posterior to anterior
vmPFC axis may relate to similar anatomical distinctions be-
tween primary and secondary rewards (McNamee et al., 2013;
Sescousse et al., 2013; Clithero and Rangel, 2014; Li et al., 2015).
dmPFC activity was negatively correlated with estimated value
from various sources of information. As in most decision tasks,
the value of the action and uncertainty/conflict associated with
that value are inversely correlated, though not perfectly coupled.
This is because, for example, it is more difficult to choose the
correct option for choices with conflicting information. Given
the literature on correlates of different decision variables in mid-
line prefrontal cortex, the activity that we observed in anterior
cingulate may reflect a form of conflict (Botvinick et al., 2004) or
a cost– benefit process that accounts for both conflict and re-
duced likelihood of reward (Rushworth et al., 2011).
If a participant was more likely to be influenced by the per-
sonal sample, BOLD activity in central vmPFC varied more with
the accordance of the sample with their imminent choice. Simi-
larly, if a participant was more likely to be influenced by the
Figure 7. Social influence in other situations. A, Scatterplot showing relationship between the use of one’s own sample during the urn task (arbitrary units) and self-reported reliance on agents
outside of the laboratory. B, Between subjects, those more likely to conform in other social situations respond more to conflict with agents and less conflict with personal samples within regions
shown previously to predict conformity from social conflict responses (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010). C, Between subjects, rTPJ responds more to accordance of agents’ choices in proportion to
tendency to adapt behavior to social cues in real-world situations (self-monitoring).
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choices of agents (relative to the personal sample) BOLD activity
in amPFC varied more with accordance of agents’ choices with
their imminent choice. This suggests that the tendency to be in-
fluenced by an information source can be tracked, to an extent, by
the sensitivity of that individual to supporting information from
that source, within specific mPFC anatomy.
Social behavior outside of the laboratory (i.e., conformity)
was inversely correlated with the influence of private evidence
during the task. In vmPFC, conformity and self-monitoring in
other contexts did predict activations. However, exploration out-
side of this region revealed a link between neural responses to task
influences and the tendency to be socially influenced in other
contexts. The tendency to adopt the decisions of others outside of
the laboratory predicted increased supramarginal gyrus re-
sponses to conflict with agents, just anterior to rTPJ (Fig. 7B). It
also predicted increased dmPFC activity when going with one’s
own sample. These results replicate findings that the tendency to
conform socially can be predicted by the neural response to social
conflict in these regions (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; for
meta-analysis, see Wu et al., 2016). Activity within rTPJ that cor-
relates with reward expectancy from observing agent choices
(Fig. 7C) in high-self-monitors may relate to findings that reward
expectancies from observing choices of others can recruit theory-
of-mind-like processes (Bruguier et al., 2010; De Martino et al.,
2013). This occurs in the absence of a live audience, suggesting
that self-monitoring relates to cognitive processes that are some-
what independent of an action’s immediate social consequences.
Stimulation of the rTPJ region enhances the tendency to take
another’s perspective (Santiesteban et al., 2012) and its activity
has been shown previously to increase when determining the
relevance of someone else’s behavior for one’s decision making
(Carter et al., 2012). Although social interactions in the task were
simulated and stylized, their relevance to real-world social set-
tings is supported by these findings.
Although results are relevant to real social contexts, we do not
suggest that the highlighted processes are exclusive to the social
domain. Indeed, the task’s logic is based on comparing inferences
from different sorts of information rather than social and nonso-
cial frames. This reflects the case for the coevolution of general
cognitive faculties and social ability (Humphrey, 1976; Emery et
al., 2007). Correspondingly, research has shown that the physiol-
ogy of value representations in “social” and “nonsocial” contexts
are similar when similar processes are used and similar models
applied (Izuma et al., 2008; Zink et al., 2008; Takahashi et al.,
2009; Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Tricomi et al., 2010;
Biele et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2012; Bartra et al., 2013; Boorman et
al., 2013). The present results suggest that any differences be-
tween social and nonsocial valuation processes in vmPFC may be
proportional to differential use of higher-order computation
and, in the future, this may prove to be the most flexible defini-
tion of a “social” reward.
Conclusions
The finding that decision-related signals in vmPFC are seg-
mented by the unique cognitive requisites of their computation is
an important step in our understanding of the representation of
value in the brain. Concurrently, our findings provide new neu-
robiological insight into the transmission of value information
between individuals and the mechanism by which confidence
expressed by others assures or discourages us in our decisions.
Looking to the future, the findings present new questions as to
how distinct valuation processes with separate neural mecha-
nisms can be altered independently by experience, damage, and
treatment.
Notes
Supplemental material, (i) a Bayesian inference framework for integrat-
ing personal information, choices of others and their confidence for
decision-making with neural correlates of value, and (ii) whole brain
activation tables are available at: https://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.
4290776. Statistical parametric maps are also deposited with www.
neurovault.org. This material has not been peer reviewed.
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